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The early twentieth century witnessed the birth of eugenics 
– the study of how to improve the human race by selective 
breeding – and the moral questions, which this subject raises, 
are more relevant than ever. Parallels are found between the 
old eugenics and what is typically referred to today as modern 
public health, biomedicine, and genetics. For instance many 
abortions today are performed on eugenic grounds, that is, in 
order to prevent the birth of babies likely to be disabled. The 
belief that the lack of certain human traits makes people less 
worth, is alluded by ethicist Peter Singer who contends that 
people who lack the capacity of self-awareness and self-control 
do not inhabit a sense of personhood, and therefore eutha-
nasia of infants and even newborn children who lack these 
capacities can be justified. And the geneticist James Watson 
apparently believes that the undesirability of children with 
Down syndrome is universal. He writes: “We already accept 
that most couples don’t want a Down child. You would be 
crazy to say that you wanted one, because that child has no 
future.” (Kafer, 2013, p.3).
Concern regarding genetic testing
Many in the disability community are deeply concerned 
about increased genetic testing. Such testing, Linda Ward 
writes, “signals powerful messages about disabled peoples’ 
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fundamental right ‘to be.’’(Ward, 2000, pp. 187-200). Indeed, 
disability theorist Wolf Wolfsenberger concludes that Western 
society is entering upon a ‘new genocide’ against people with 
disabilities (Wolfsenberger, 1987, pp.68-69). Thus, when Alison 
Kafer, a queer theorist, writes, “a future with disability is a 
future no one wants” (Kafer, 2013, p. 3), she is expressing the 
near-universal understanding of disability as either defect or 
disease. Because disability points to a ‘lack’ or something that 
is missing, a better future “is one that excludes disability and 
disabled bodies; indeed it is the very absence of disability that 
signals this better future.”(Kafer, 2013, p.2). 
Biblical images to blame?
Theologians have placed much of the blame for the prejudice 
and discrimination faced by people with disabilities at the feet 
of Scripture and the discourse of theology itself. Drawing our 
attention to the scriptural representation of the Kingdom of 
God as a place where the blind see, the deaf hear, and the lame 
walk, – a place, in other words, where physical disability is 
redeemed. Amos Yong contends that Jesus’s miraculous power 
to heal “reinforces the normate (sighted) belief that God is 
glorified not in disability but only in its overcoming.” (Yong, 
2001, p.53). Moreover, theologians argue that the explication of 
the imago Dei in terms of rational functions and capabilities 
undermines the worth of people with disabilities. For her part 
Nancy Eiesland concludes that the constructs and practices of 
theology “have assumed an able-bodied hermeneutic for de-
ciphering human experience and developing an image of God.” 
(Cited in Swinton, 2011, pp.276-277). 
 This paper explores how a Trinitarian and relational in-
terpretation of the imago Dei can help to liberate the notion of 
disability from the bonds of social and theological prejudice.  
My thesis is that a relational interpretation of the imago Dei 
can help us rethink the dualism of abled versus disabled that 
so often leads to the dehumanization of people with disabiliti-
es. More generally, such an interpretation can lead us to a new 
appreciation for the place of interdependency and vulnerabi-
lity in human nature.
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The rational imago Dei
Disability scholars point out that disability is constructed as 
deviant because the goods which modern liberal societies 
value and hold as normal are goods that people with disability 
appear to lack. For instance, Thomas E. Reynolds argues that 
people with disabilities are deemed abnormal because they do 
not have the autonomy, independence, and intellectual skill 
– what he calls “body capital” – to participate in the accepted 
economy of exchange (Reynolds, 2008, p.24). The work of scho-
lars such as Catherine M. LaCugna, Stanley J. Grenz, Charles 
Taylor and Jürgen Moltmann to name a few, shows that the 
modern values of autonomy have been strongly influenced by 
the Christian idea of the imago Dei as a rational substance. 
Augustine
 In the Early church period, St. Augustine, whose outlook 
was influenced by Plato, relates the divine image to a sense 
of “inwardness.” He proves God’s existence on the basis of our 
experience of knowing and reasoning: “I am aware of my own 
sensing and thinking; and in reflecting on this, I am made 
aware of its dependence on something beyond myself.” (Cited 
in Taylor, 1989, p.134). He defines the rational soul as the chief 
seat of the divine image: “man was made after the image of 
Him that created him, not according to the body, but the rati-
onal mind, wherein the knowledge of God exists.” (Augustine, 
2002). For the soul was made rational to enable it to return to 
God. The return to God is accomplished by knowing God, and 
since knowledge is the province of the soul, one discovers God 
by means of an “inward” journey: “Do not go outward; return 
within yourself. In the inward man dwells truth.” (Quoted in 
Taylor, 1989, p.129). In Augustine’s theology the presence of 
truth in one’s individual soul is an index of the presence of 
divine truth. Because the path to God lies in the inward self, 
the surest sign of truth lies within the self as well. He assumes 
that through the mastery of instrumental reason the human 
being establishes herself as wholly independent of anything 
outside of herself, including her body. As Catherine M. LaCug-
na explains, “largely due to the influence of the introspective 
psychology of Augustine and his heirs, we in the West today 
think of a person as a “self” who may be further defined as an 
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individual center of consciousness, a free, intentional subje-
ct.” (LaCugna, 1991, p. 250). Augustine’s identification of the 
imago Dei with the inwardness of self-consciousness stands 
in contrast to the “outwardness” of the world on which that 
self-consciousness depends for its existence. Some will argue 
that Augustine is the inaugurator of the modern concept of 
the individual self as autonomous and independent. 
St. Thomas Aquinas
 In the medieval period, St. Thomas Aquinas adopted 
Augustine’s definition of the imago Dei as a rational human 
being. Aquinas is an Aristotelian who does not, like Augustine, 
advocate the acquisition of knowledge through introspecti-
on. He holds that knowledge of everything, including God, 
“proceeds from sensory to intelligible things, from effects to 
causes, from what is posterior to what is a priori…” (Aquinas, 
1975). Notwithstanding this outward orientation of the process 
of knowledge-acquisition, Aquinas defines the human being 
as “an individual substance of a rational nature.” (Aquinas, 
1946). He conceives of the imago Dei as the soul’s highest 
faculty – a mind that is a “subsistent” entity, independent of 
the body and anything else for its activity: “It must necessarily 
be allowed that the principle of intellectual operation, which 
we call the soul of man, is a principle both incorporeal and 
subsistent.” (Aquinas, 1946). In order to arrive at a unified 
view of God, he contends, one must abandon the multiplicity 
of exterior things, including the body, and depend solely on 
the knowledge of the mind. Moreover, since image of God 
consists in “the very nature of the mind, common to all men,” 
(Aquinas, 1946) proper image-bearers are intellectual creatures 
who actively understand and love God, because in doing so 
they imitate God in God’s own ability to understand and love 
Godself. The active use of reasoning defines what is human in 
Aquinas’s thought.
Reformation - Luther and Calvin
In the Reformation theologians emphasized human depravity 
as a consequence of original sin, while they retained the defi-
nition of human nature as the rational capacity of the imago 
Dei. For Martin Luther, the imago Dei does not consist of 
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intellectual capacities in themselves, but of the right ordering 
and functioning of these capacities. He writes: “Moses says 
that man is not only like God in this respect that he has the 
ability to reason, but also that he has a likeness of God, that 
is, an intellect and will by which he understands God and by 
which he desires what God desires.” (Luther, 1958, p.337). Thus, 
for Luther, we are not only in the image of God because we 
have intellect and will, but because it is with these faculties 
that we actually understand and love God. While Original Sin 
has made our intellectual abilities deficient, Christ’s grace and 
human faith has to some extent renewed them. For Luther, 
David Cairns asserts, the imago Dei is “entirely determined by 
man’s response to God.” (Cairns, 1953, p.104). 
 Like Luther, John Calvin holds that human beings, by vir-
tue of our minds, and despite being plagued by the ingrained 
sin of Adam, are unique self-representations of God. Central to 
his teaching on the imago Dei is the idea that the divine image 
is like a mirror. God calls human beings to reflect the glory of 
God from their creaturely position. Identifying the image of 
God as the substance of the intellectual soul, he asserts that 
the knowledge of God represents the soul’s true life because it 
directs us towards wisdom and obedience to God. For Cal-
vin, rationality serves as the prime constituent of the divine 
image because it enables us to respond to God. Like Luther, he 
conceives of the image as consisting not in rational faculties 
themselves, but in their proper functioning. We are in the 
image of God, properly speaking, when our intellect is directed 
towards knowledge of and obedience to God in such a way that 
in us God can see Godself as in a mirror. 
Enlightenment - Descartes
In the Enlightenment period, Rene Descartes developed a 
rigid conception of the person as intelligent and autonomous. 
Descartes asserts that existence itself is characterized by the 
life or activity of the rational soul, which God placed in the 
chief seat of the brain. He argues that the only faculties that 
are truly human are cognitive ones: consciousness, volition, 
memory, and reason. “No actions are human,” he asserts, “un-
less they depend on reason.” (Descartes, 2003, p.114). For him, 
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the principal duty in life is to find truth by using one’s reason 
and by rejecting the corporeal world. In Descartes’s thought, a 
human being’s existence owes nothing to anything outside of 
herself; she can potentially exist independent of society and 
social relations. 
 Stanley J. Grenz argues that ever since the Enlightenment, 
Western philosophy has focused on ‘self-mastery:’ “the self 
takes charge of the world it inhabits in both its outer and its 
inner dimension, so as to constitute itself and determine its 
identity.” (Grenz, 2001, p. 67). Locating the image of God in the 
rational and subsistent soul creates the illusion that human 
beings are capable of independently mastering the world 
though the exercise of instrumental reason. Indeed, Colin 
Gunton opines that the definition of the imago Dei as a rati-
onal substance “stands at the heart of the troubles” that are 
endemic to modern individualism (Gunton, 1997, p.92). 
Disability and modern values
Disability scholars argue that disabled bodies are marginali-
zed because their appearance poses a threat to modern values. 
The image of bodies and minds that are presumed to be suffe-
ring confronts society with the reality of human powerlessness 
and frailty. Rosemarie Garland-Thomson writes, “the disabled 
figure calls into question such concepts as will, ability, pro-
gress, responsibility, and free agency; notions around which 
people in a liberal society organize their identities.” (Gar-
land-Thomson, 1997, p.47). People with disabilities threaten 
to subvert the ideals of the modern self by revealing the false 
pretenses of existential normalcy. Mary J. Owen asserts, “Tho-
se of us with disabilities are precisely the people who prove to 
society how frail and vulnerable the human creature is.”  “That 
reality,” she adds, “often frightens non-disabled people into 
avoiding us.” (Owen, 1998, p.4). The fantasy of the abled body 
is constructed by conjuring up the disabled body as its mon-
strous “other.” 
 When we look into how the imago Dei has been defined 
within the Christian tradition, those of us who are concerned 
with the humanity of people with disabilities are in for a disap-
pointment. The rational imago Dei creates the notion that pe-
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ople with disabilities are inferior and thus needs to be rearti-
culated. The following section will examine the interpretation 
of the Trinitarian God as a perichoretic unity (see explanation 
below), and interrogate what it means to be human in the ima-
go Trinitatis. 
God as a perichoretic unity  
It was the Cappadocian Fathers who developed a theology of 
the Trinity on the basis of perichoresis – the mutual indwelling 
of the divine Persons – and used this concept to emphasize 
the intrinsic relationship between Jesus’s divine and human 
natures. It was John of Damascene who first used it to describe 
the relationship of the three Persons to one another within the 
divine being. The Cappadocian Fathers and John of Damasce-
ne interpreted the very essence of God as relational. 
 Catherine LaCugna insists that God as Trinity demonstra-
tes that God’s self-expression does not belong to God alone 
and that God’s Trinitarian life includes our life. She argues 
that if we want to learn what something is – whether God, 
humanity, or creation as a whole – we must ask, “how is it 
related?” LaCugna argues that the persons of the Trinity do 
not exist for the Trinity’s sake. This is expressed in her well-
known thesis, “God’s To-Be is To-Be-in-relationship, and God’s 
being-in-relationship-to-us, is what God is.” (LaCugna, 1991, 
p. 248) God as Trinity is a theology of relationships par excel-
lence: God to us, we to God, we to each other and the rest of 
creation. God exists perichoretically. The persons of the Trinity 
mutually permeate each other with love and extend this love 
outward and “other-ward” towards creation. LaCugna propo-
ses a doctrine of the Trinity in the light of “relational metaphy-
sics” and asserts that God has a “real” relation to creation. The 
persons of the Trinity are persons-in-relation; they gain their 
personal identity by means of their relationship to each other 
and to the world. Likewise Jürgen Moltmann says: “By virtue 
of their eternal love they live in one another to such an extent, 
and dwell in one another to such an extent, that they are one.” 
(Moltmann, 1981, p.175). In the Trinitarian God we find “a 
mutual indwelling of the world in God and God in the world.” 
(Moltmann, 1996, p. 307). 
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Trinitarianism as inclusive communion
The mutual interpenetration (perichoresis) of the divine Per-
sons establishes an inclusive communion where each Person 
receives everything from the Other and at the same time gives 
everything to the Other. Moltmann and LaCugna argue that 
because God’s being is radically relational, ours is too. Relati-
onality is the door through which we emerge as persons and 
begin to become the perfect bearers of the image of God that 
God intended us to become. This leads us to a basic ontologi-
cal truth: we are radically dependent on each other to be: “I am 
because we are.” (Reynolds, 2008, p.14). We are called to the 
kind of relationship that is based on a mutuality and interde-
pendence: a mode of being and living that fosters nonhierar-
chical and inclusive relationships where we are, in LaCugna’s 
words, “equal partners in a divine dance.” (LaCugna, 1991, p. 
299). Dependency also makes us vulnerable, that is, capable of 
being wounded: I might give myself to you, and you might not 
accept me. Individualism dominates Western morality becau-
se it equates vulnerability with dependency—the very failure 
of self- sufficiency. People with disabilities are shunned becau-
se they are seen as vulnerable and dependent. Yet vulnerabi-
lity, although it can be frightening, is a condition that affects 
everyone and for that reason binds us together. One might say 
that individualism ends where vulnerability begins. Moreover, 
without being willing to make ourselves vulnerable to other 
people, we cannot earn their trust and build relationships with 
them. An awareness of our common vulnerability becomes 
a source of love and concern for others. Martha Nussbaum 
contends that although human life is dangerous, the virtues 
only become available in this realm of vulnerability. The basic 
anthropological constants of relationality make us vulnerable 
to the vicissitudes of a finite and ambiguous life. Yet they are 
the conditions that make love possible. 
Trinitarian relations as hermeneutical location
By using Trinitarian relations as a hermeneutical location it is 
possible to understand relationality, dependency and vulnera-
bility as essential to our human condition. In a world that sees 
people with disabilities as lacking “body-capital,” recognition 
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of our interdependency and vulnerability can help to dismant-
le the ideology of ableism and demonstrate the false pretenses 
of normalcy. The imago Dei does not call us to be autonomous 
and success-worthy; it calls us to be dependent, vulnerable, 
and attentive to the needs of others. John Zizioulas sums it up 
beautifully when he says, “It is communion that makes things 
‘be’; nothing exists without it, not even God.” (Zizioulas, 1993, 
p.17).
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